

- Algorithms/Programs
Algorithms were used since antiquity, but became an object of study only early in the 20th century.
- Universal Computer
In early “computers”, the program was part of the hardware. You had to rewire the computer to run a different program.
In contrast, a **universal computer** is a computer that can run **any program**.

1936 was the *annus mirabilis* of computation, the year where everything came to fit together.

What shall we do to get rid of Mr. Babbage and his calculating machine? Surely if completed it would be worthless as far as science is concerned?

British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, 1842



Punched cards already existed in the early 19th century. Babbage’s Analytical Engine used them to design a computer that can execute any program given to it.

A universal computer can execute an interpreter (“universal program”): It reads the source code of another program and executes it.

$$U(\langle P \rangle, x) = P(x)$$

So we can define a program V as follows: $V(\langle P \rangle) = \overline{P(\langle P \rangle)}$.

Charles Babbage’s **Differential Engine** for computing tables of trigonometric functions, logarithms, etc.



Toy computer

1900 David Hilbert gave a speech to the International Congress of Mathematicians presenting 23 open problems.

Hilbert’s 10th Problem:

Specify a **procedure** which, in a finite number of operations, enables one to determine whether or not a given Diophantine equation with an arbitrary number of variables has an integer solution.

polynomial equation with integer coefficients

1928, Hilbert posed the **Entscheidungsproblem**:

The Entscheidungsproblem is solved if one knows a **procedure** that allows one to decide the validity of a given logical expression by a finite number of operations.

Hilbert didn't say what he meant by a procedure, and computers were still decades away.

The early 20th century saw mathematicians struggle with putting mathematics on a foundation of set theory and logic.

Russell's paradox: $R = \{S \mid S \notin S\}$.

In the early 20th century models of computation were defined using ideas from set theory, but it was not clear whether any of them captured the universe of all conceivable computations.

In 1936, all these models turned out to be equivalent, giving rise to the **Church-Turing Thesis**.

Consider the problem: Given a program P , does P hold for every possible input x ?

We can express this as

$$\forall x \exists t \text{ HALTSINTIME}(P, x, t)$$

Imagine a **hypercomputer** that has access to a black box that solves the halting problem (in finite time).

A hypercomputer cannot solve the halting problem for hypercomputers.

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$$\text{HALTS}(P, x) = \exists t \text{ HALTSINTIME}(P, x, t)$$

(Recursively) enumerable problems (RE) are exactly the problems A of the form $A(x) = \exists w B(x, w)$, where B is decidable.

coRE is the family of complements of enumerable languages. A language A is in coRE if and only if it can be expressed as $A(x) = \forall w B(x, w)$, where B is decidable.

We have shown

$$\text{Decidable} = \text{RE} \cap \text{coRE}$$

A **formal system** has a set of axioms and rules of inference.

A **theorem** is a statement that can be proved, with some finite chain of reasoning, from the axioms.

A formal system is **consistent** if there is no statement T such that both T and \bar{T} are theorems, and **complete** if, for all T , at least one of T or \bar{T} is a theorem.

In 1931, Kurt Gödel proved that **no sufficiently powerful formal system is both consistent and complete**.

His proof constructs a self-referential statement that says:

This statement cannot be proved.

There were several attempts to define computation. Mathematicians concentrated on **computable functions**.

- **Primitive recursive functions** are functions built from simpler functions (with zero and the successor function as the basis) and primitive recursion. It is equivalent to a straight-line program with for-loops.

The **Ackermann**-function is not primitive recursive.

- **Partial recursive functions** add μ -recursion (equivalent to while-loops).
- **λ -calculus** defines computation by functions that operate on strings:

$$(\lambda x : xax)bc \rightarrow bcabc$$

[A Turing machine] is able to imitate any automaton, even a much more complicated one. . . It has reached a certain minimum level of complexity. . . an automaton of this complexity can, when given suitable instructions, do anything that can be done by automata at all.

John von Neumann


Any system that can simulate a Turing machine can carry out any computation at all. It is **computationally universal**.

Partial recursive functions and the λ -calculus turned out to be equivalent and are powerful. But do they cover everything that Hilbert would have called a “finite procedure”?


There were other definitions of recursive functions, and Gödel thought the λ -calculus to be “thoroughly unsatisfactory”.

The Turing machine was more convincing to many people, and it is equivalent to partial recursive functions and to the λ -calculus.

A **counter machine** is a finite automaton with a finite number of integer counters. It can increment and decrement the counters, and test if they are zero.




A two-counter machine can simulate a Turing machine.



It cannot read or write, only move its position and test if it is on the edge.

This is a two-counter machine in disguise.

Game of Life is a cellular automaton on the two-dimensional infinite lattice invented by John Horton Conway in 1970. A cell is born when it has exactly three live neighbors, and dies if it has less than two or more than three live neighbors (loneliness or overcrowding).



This is a program in the programming language FRACTRAN:

$$\frac{17}{91} \frac{78}{85} \frac{19}{51} \frac{23}{38} \frac{29}{33} \frac{29}{29} \frac{77}{23} \frac{95}{19} \frac{77}{17} \frac{1}{13} \frac{11}{11} \frac{13}{13} \frac{15}{11} \frac{15}{14} \frac{55}{2} \frac{1}{1}$$


The state is an integer n . In each step, find the first fraction p/q in the list where $m = (p/q)n$ is an integer, and replace n by m .

This program computes the prime numbers.


FRACTRAN can simulate a counter machine, and therefore a Turing machine.

It is a special case of a Collatz sequence, which shows that the Collatz problem is undecidable.

A glider gun:




The Tiling problem is to decide if one can tile the two-dimensional plane with tiles of a given set of types.



Wang tiles have a color along each edge, and the color of neighboring tiles have to match.

Given a TM M , we design a set of Wang tiles s.t. each row is one step of M 's computation.



If there is no tile with the HALT state, then the plane will be tiled if and only if M runs forever.